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Abstract
In this article a critical reflection upon age limits applied in
the law is provided, in light of the tension that exists in
international children’s rights law between the protection of
children and the recognition of their evolving autonomy.
The main research question that will be addressed is to what
extent the use of (certain) age limits is justified under inter-
national children’s rights law. The complexity of applying
open norms and theoretically underdeveloped concepts as
laid down in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,
related to the development and evolving capacities of chil-
dren as rights holders, will be demonstrated. The UN Com-
mittee on the Rights of the Child struggles to provide com-
prehensive guidance to states regarding the manner in
which the dynamic legal position of children should be
applied in practice. The inconsistent application of age limits
that govern the involvement of children in judicial proce-
dures provides states leeway in granting children autonomy,
potentially leading to the establishment of age limits based
on inappropriate – practically, politically or ideologically
motivated – grounds.
Keywords: age limits, dynamic legal position, children’s
rights, maturity, evolving capacities
1 Introduction
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC) departs from the presumptions that chil-
dren are independent rights holders and that, because of
their development and particular dependency and vul-
nerability, they require specific rights assuring treat-
ment with humanity and respect for human dignity and
in a manner that takes into account their age and matur-
ity.1 Several scholars have noted the tension within the
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1. CRC, preamble; J. Sloth-Nielsen, ‘Ratification of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child: Some implications for South African Law’, 11 South
CRC between protecting children on the one hand and
on the other hand recognising children’s evolving
autonomy, which is, among others, reflected in the right
to participate in diverse settings and decisions affecting
them.2 The adoption of the CRC and the subsequent
international and regional developments in international
children’s rights law have resulted in a comprehensive
and multi-layered legal framework, under which chil-
dren are defined as persons under the age of eighteen
(see Art. 1 CRC) and are entitled to rights that safe-
guard their protection (against violence, exploitation
and unlawful interference with private life, integrity and
liberty), access to quality services and provisions (e.g.
education, health care, social security, adequate stand-
ard of living, leisure and play) and participation.3
The inherent tension between protection and evolving
autonomy becomes apparent when taking a closer look
at the guidance that is given to CRC states parties
regarding the implementation of certain rights in differ-
ent contexts. The CRC deliberately enshrines norms
and principles that are open and vague, in order to
accommodate differences between states parties and to
facilitate adaptation to different (legal) contexts.4 The
principle of the best interests of the child (Art. 3(1)
CRC) – one of the assumed guiding principles of the
CRC, acknowledging its relevance for the interpretation
and implementation of all other rights5 – is an example
African Journal on Human Rights 401 (1995); N. Cantwell, ‘The Ori-
gins, Development and Significance of the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child’, in S. Detrick (ed.), The United Nations Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child. A Guide to the “Travaux prépara-
toires” (1992) 19.
2. N. Peleg, ‘Illusion of Inclusion: Challenging Universalistic Conceptions in
International Children’s Rights Law’, 24 Australian Journal of Human
Rights 326, at 328-329 (2018); S. Varadan, ‘The Principle of Evolving
Capacities under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child’, 27 The
International Journal of Children’s Rights 306, at 322 (2019); G. Lans-
down, The Evolving Capacities of the Child (2005), at 5.
3. U. Kilkelly and T. Liefaard, ‘International Children’s Rights: Reflections
on a Complex, Dynamic, and Relatively Young Area of Law’, in U. Kil-
kelly and T. Liefaard (eds.), International Human Rights of Children
(2019) 617; K. Arts, ‘Twenty-Five Years of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child: Achievements and Challenges’, 61
Netherlands International Law Review 267 (2014).
4. T. Liefaard, Deprivation of Liberty of Children in Light of International
Human Rights Law and Standards (2008).
5. UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 14
(2013) on the Right of the Child to Have His or Her Best Interests
4
ELR augustus 2020 | No. 1 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000158
of such a vague and open norm, which is flexible but
difficult to interpret and implement in practice at the
same time.6 Also, the concepts of giving due weight to
the views of the child in accordance with his or her age
and maturity (Art. 12(1) CRC) and the evolving capaci-
ties of the child (Art. 5 CRC) are subject to diverse
interpretations and are criticised for giving little guid-
ance to states and professionals in practice.7 Tobin sig-
nals the lack of consensus on the meaning of particular
children’s rights and on the balance between protection
and autonomy that needs to be established.8 Hollings-
worth explains that the law should aim to provide the
child with capacities for developing full autonomy and
into a fully autonomous rights holder.9 In light of this,
children are seen as human beings in development,
which distinguishes them from adults and merits their
special treatment by the law. It is important to note that
the CRC itself lacks thorough theoretical foundation10
and that, as will be discussed below, the guidance pro-
vided by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child
(CRC Committee) is not always clear or consistent.
However, it is evident that under international child-
ren’s rights law, children are entitled to a dynamic legal
position that develops along with their age and
increasing maturity and that this particular position is
often expressed in domestic law through the imposition
of different age limits. The dynamic legal position and
the corresponding fluid concepts are thus, in practice,
combined with more static notions such as age limits.
Taken as a Primary Consideration (Art. 3, para. 1) (CRC/C/GC/14)
(2013), para. 1.
6. See for instance M. Freeman, A Commentary on the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 3: The Best Interests of
the Child (2007).
7. See for example A. Daly, ‘No Weight for “Due Weight”? A Children’s
Autonomy Principle in Best Interest Proceedings’, 26 The International
Journal of Children’s Rights 61 (2018); K. Hanson, ‘Children’s Participa-
tion and Agency When They Don’t “Do the Right Thing”’, 23 Child-
hood 471 (2016); E.K.M. Tisdall, ‘Children and Young People’s Partici-
pation: A Critical Consideration of Article 12’, in W. Vandenhole,
E. Desmet, D. Reynaert and S. Lembrechts (eds.), Routledge Inter-
national Handbook of Children’s Rights Studies (2015) 185; T. Lie-
faard, ‘Juvenile Justice from an International Children’s Rights Perspec-
tive’, in W. Vandenhole, E. Desmet, D. Reynaert and S. Lembrechts
(eds.), Routledge International Handbook of Children’s Rights Studies
(2015) 234.
8. J. Tobin, ‘Understanding a Human Rights Based Approach to Matters
Involving Children: Conceptual Foundations and Strategic Considera-
tions’, in A. Invernizzi and J. Williams (eds.), The Human Rights of Chil-
dren: From Visions to Implementation (2011) 61, at 78; see also
K. Hanson, ‘Schools of Thought in Children’s Rights’, in M. Liebel,
K. Hanson, I. Saadi and W. Vandenhole (eds.), Children’s Rights from
Below: Cross-Cultural Perspectives (2012) 63, at 70.
9. K. Hollingsworth, ‘Theorising Children’s Rights in Youth Justice: The
Significance of Autonomy and Foundational Rights’, 76 The Modern
Law Review 1046, at 1060 (2013).
10. J. Tobin, ‘Seeking to Persuade: A Constructive Approach to Human
Rights Treaty Interpretation’, 23 Harvard Human Rights Journal 1
(2010); Tobin (2011), above n. 8; M. Freeman, ‘Why It Remains
Important to Take Children’s Rights Seriously’, 15 The International
Journal of Children’s Rights 5, at 10 (2007); M. Freeman, ‘Taking
Children’s Rights More Seriously’, 6 International Journal of Law and
the Family 52, at 59 (1992); J. Eekelaar, ‘The Emergence of Children’s
Rights’, 6 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 161, at 170-171 (1986);
Hanson, above n. 8; K. Hanson and N. Peleg, ‘Waiting for Children’s
Rights Theory’, 28 International Journal of Children’s Rights 15 (2020).
This raises the question, To what extent is the use of
(certain) age limits justified under international child-
ren’s rights law?
This article provides a critical reflection upon age and
age limits, in light of the tension between protecting
children and recognising their evolving autonomy under
international children’s rights law. This article, first,
reflects on the position of children and their evolving
capacities within the CRC, as the key instrument of
international children’s rights law. Subsequently, the
practical application of age limits is attended to by pro-
viding various case studies of how age limits are estab-
lished by states parties in different legal contexts (name-
ly, in juvenile justice, family law and care proceedings
and migration law). The article concludes with some
observations and reflections on the justification for the
use of age limits under international children’s rights
law.
2 The Perspective of the CRC
on Children and Evolving
Capacities
The CRC can be characterised as a game changer as an
instrument of international human rights law that recog-
nises children as rights holders in the first place.11 The
question as to what extent children have human rights
and fundamental freedoms now seems superfluous.12
The CRC grants children additional or special rights
that recognise their special status as being dependent,
vulnerable or in need of special protection.13 Moreover,
the CRC provides guidance regarding the enjoyment of
rights. Article 5 CRC acknowledges, on the one hand,
the child as rights holder who is entitled to enjoy his or
her rights. At the same time, this core provision of the
CRC recognises parents or others responsible for the
child (including members of the extended family) as the
ones who have the right, responsibility and duty to pro-
vide ‘appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise
by the child of the rights recognized in the CRC’. This
direction and guidance must be given, however, in a
manner that respects the child’s ‘evolving capacities’.
With the introduction of the child’s ‘evolving capaci-
ties’, Article 5 CRC reflects an attempt by the inter-
national legal community to capture the biological fact
that children develop and mature over time and that this
has implications for the role of the child’s legal repre-
sentative, in a provision of international law.14
11. See Freeman (2007), above n. 10; J. Tobin, ‘Introduction: The Founda-
tion for Children’s Rights’, in J. Tobin (ed.), The UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child: A Commentary (2019) 2.
12. G. van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child
(1995).
13. See e.g. Art. 19 CRC (protection against all forms of violence in a care
setting) and Art. 31 CRC (right to leisure and play).
14. The CRC has, in a way, defined childhood as the period of time in
which a person becomes 18 years of age, see Art. 1 CRC. This is not
meant to serve other than as the age range to which the CRC is appli-
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The drafters of the CRC have chosen to include the
concept of evolving capacities as the solution to the ten-
sion between the recognition of the need to protect the
child and of the growing autonomy of the child. Con-
sequently, the CRC can be seen as an instrument that
recognises children as both in need of protection and as
human beings with independent rights that they should
be able to exercise in accordance with their develop-
ment.15 On the basis of a comprehensive analysis of Art-
icle 5 CRC, Varadan concludes that in the three decades
that have passed since the adoption of the CRC, the
notion of evolving capacities has been given much
broader meaning, in particular, by the CRC Committee,
with – among others – more than eighty references in
nineteen of the General Comments.16 As Varadan notes,
[I]t would appear that the Committee has introduced
a broader principle of evolving capacities under the
UNCRC that … informs … the interpretation and
implementation of the Convention as a whole.17
Its meaning has thus been extended beyond the mere
implications for the role of parents and others legally
responsible for the child.
The notion of ‘evolving capacities’ can be seen as crucial
to the conception of children and their rights under
international law.18 Prior to the adoption of the CRC,
the protection of family autonomy and the rights of
parents with regard to the upbringing of their children
had already been well established in various instruments
of international law.19 The phrasing in Article 5 CRC,
where it is stated that adults should provide appropriate
direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of his
or her rights, makes clear that this direction and guid-
ance should be provided in a manner that respects the
rights of the child.20 Varadan describes this as ‘a some-
what radical departure from the traditional parent-child
relationship, in which parents were the primary rights-
holders and the child was a passive recipient of protec-
tion and care’.21
The emphasis placed by the CRC Committee on the
notion of evolving capacities has also had implications
for the establishment of age limits and has, in fact, been
used as a policy principle by the CRC Committee to
encourage both the recognition of children’s increasing
autonomy and the establishment of (minimum) age laws
in different areas.22 However, this has led to an inconsis-
tent framework of (minimum) age limits that varies
cable, but it resonates with many domestic legal systems as well with
other human rights instruments; T. Liefaard, ‘Juveniles in Transition
from Juvenile Justice to Adult Criminal Justice’, in R. Loeber, M. Hoeve,
N.W. Slot and P. van der Laan (eds.), Persisters and Desisters in Crime
from Adolescence into Adulthood: Explanation, Prevention and Punish-
ment (2012) 159.
15. Peleg, above n. 2, at 6; Varadan, above n. 2, at 5.
16. Varadan, above n. 2, at 308; see also Lansdown, above n. 2.
17. Varadan, above n. 2, at 329.
18. Ibid., at 307.
19. See for example ibid.; Lansdown, above n. 2, at 5.
20. Varadan, above n. 2, at 319-320; Lansdown, above n. 2, at 5-6.
21. Ibid., at 307.
22. Ibid., at 326-327.
across legal fields and settings. The most fundamental
age limit that can be found in the CRC, arguably, is in
Article 1, which defines a child as ‘every person under
the age of 18’, although exceptions can apply. For
example, in General Comment No. 4,23 the CRC Com-
mittee states,
States parties need to ensure that specific legal provi-
sions are guaranteed under domestic law, including
with regard to setting a minimum age for sexual con-
sent, marriage and the possibility of medical treat-
ment without parental consent. These minimum ages
should be the same for boys and girls … and closely
reflect the recognition of the status of human beings
under eighteen years of age as rights holders, in
accordance with their evolving capacity, age and
maturity.24
In General Comment No. 20, the CRC Committee
states that minimum legal age limits should be intro-
duced that recognise the right of adolescents to take
increasing responsibility in decision making, for
example, ‘in respect of health services or treatment, con-
sent to adoption, change of name or applications to fam-
ily courts’.25 However, the CRC Committee also asks
states to allow exceptions to those minimum age limits:
‘In all cases, the right of any child below that minimum
age and able to demonstrate sufficient understanding to
be entitled to give or refuse consent should be recog-
nized’.26 With respect to the right to be heard (Art. 12
CRC), the CRC Committee actually discourages states
parties from introducing age limits – in law or in prac-
tice – because it would restrict the child’s right to be
heard.27 With regard to this right, the CRC Committee
states that ‘[b]y requiring that due weight be given in
accordance with age and maturity, Article 12 makes it
clear that age alone cannot determine the significance of
a child’s views’.28 Contrarily, in other areas, significant-
ly stricter guidance is given with respect to establishing
age limits. In General Comment No. 20, for example,
the CRC Committee
reaffirms that the minimum age limit should be
eighteen years for marriage, recruitment into the
armed forces, involvement in hazardous or exploita-
tive work and the purchase and consumption of alco-
23. The General Comments are authoritative, yet non-binding, recommen-
dations made by the CRC Committee about how to implement certain
provisions of the CRC.
24. UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 4:
Adolescent Health and Development in the Context of the Convention
on the Rights of the Child (CRC/GC/2003/4) (2003), para. 5.
25. UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 20 on
the Implementation of the Rights of the Child During Adolescence
(CRC/C/GC/20) (2016), para. 39.
26. UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (2016), above n. 25, para.
39.
27. UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 12:
The Right of the Child to be Heard (CRC/C/GC/12) (2009), paras. 21,
31.
28. UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (2009), above n. 27, para.
85.
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hol and tobacco, in view of the degree of associated
risk and harm.29
Notwithstanding this seemingly absolute minimum age
limit, in an earlier joint general recommendation with
the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimi-
nation against Women, some leeway was provided to
allow a lower minimum age limit for marriage:
When a marriage at an earlier age is allowed in excep-
tional circumstances, the absolute minimum age must
not be below sixteen years, the grounds for obtaining
permission must be legitimate and strictly defined by
law and the marriage must be permitted only by a
court of law upon the full, free and informed consent
of the child or both children, who must appear in
person before the court.30
Another example is that the CRC Committee advocates
for fourteen as the minimum age of criminal responsi-
bility (MACR), although it also commends states that
have a higher minimum, such as fifteen or sixteen years
of age.31 The CRC Committee has based this recom-
mendation on scientific research on child and adolescent
brain development. The explicit requirement to estab-
lish an MACR (Art. 40(3)(a) CRC) reflects the wish to
protect children below a certain age from involvement
in the justice system because of its potential harmful
effects as well as the recognition of the responsibility of
children for their behavior from a certain age onwards.32
Thus, Article 5 CRC, although originally meant to reg-
ulate the position of parents and other legal representa-
tives in relation to the enjoyment of rights by the child,
has been acknowledged as a key provision defining the
legal status of children under international children’s
rights law. It reflects the child’s development, evolving
capacities and growing autonomy. It consequently gives
guidance on how to strike a balance between protection
on the one hand and participation and autonomy on the
other hand. However, the approach of the CRC Com-
mittee with regard to capacities of children seems incon-
sistent, both substantively (see, for instance, the differ-
ent options for the minimum age of marriage) and pro-
cedurally. As far as the latter is concerned, the CRC
Committee renounces the use of age limits with regard
to the right to be heard, since such limits can easily be
used against children’s participation (i.e. as a restric-
tion). At the same time, the CRC Committee provides
recommendations for specific age limits in order to pro-
29. UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (2016), above n. 25, para.
40.
30. UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
and UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Joint General Recom-
mendation No. 31 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimi-
nation Against Women/General Comment No. 18 of the Committee on
the Rights of the Child on Harmful Practices (CEDAW/C/GC/31-
CRC/C/GC/18) (2014), para. 55 sub f.
31. UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 24
(2019), Children’s Rights in the Child Justice System (CRC/C/GC/24)
(2019), paras. 21-22.
32. See UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (2019), above n. 31, para
6(c).
tect certain groups of children and prevent legal uncer-
tainty and/or arbitrary treatment.
3 Practical Perspectives on Age
Limits
Children’s actual involvement in judicial proceedings
and the legal capacity that is assigned to them is general-
ly tied to age limits that are enshrined in domestic law.
In the European Union (EU), children’s capacity to take
legal action or invoke judicial proceedings in their own
right varies widely across, and within, member states.33
In half of the EU member states, children depend on
legal representatives and/or guardians (usually parents)
to bring a case before a court in civil and administrative
proceedings. Also, minimum age limits are applied,
ranging from twelve to sixteen years, to regulate the
right of children to act in legal proceedings. Kennan and
Kilkelly conclude that a selective and restrictive
approach to the procedural rights of children has an
impact on practice, because children are reliant on
adults and their legal actions to vindicate their rights.34
The EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) has con-
cluded, in a recent overview of age limits in EU member
states, that the right of children to be heard in legal pro-
ceedings varies remarkably among and within states as
well, and across different areas of law (e.g. family, crim-
inal and asylum and immigration law).35 Todres has
drawn similar conclusions on the basis of his analysis of
the concept of maturity and age limits as applied in the
United States in different legal areas. The legal con-
struct of maturity is applied inconsistently in the law,
across and within certain issues related to children.36
For the purposes of this article, however, the analysis
will be directed mostly to the European context.
In this section, case studies are presented of the various
age limits that states apply in different areas of law,
namely, in juvenile justice, family law and care proceed-
ings and migration law. This section serves the purpose
of providing examples of age limits that are set and the
purposes these serve. It is not aimed at providing an
exhaustive overview of all age thresholds within a cer-
tain area of law.
33. N. Kennan and U. Kilkelly, Children’s Involvement in Criminal, Civil
and Administrative Judicial Proceedings in the 28 Member States of
the EU (2015), https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/
publication/c3cd307f-ff03-4010-b322-dcf7063403c5; E. Jansen, ‘De
eigen(aardige) procesbevoegdheid van de minderjarige’, 30 Nederlands
Juristenblad 2177 (2016).
34. Kennan and Kilkelly (2015), above n. 33.
35. FRA, Children’s Rights and Justice. Minimum Age Requirements in the
EU (2018), https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2018/minimum-age-
justice.
36. J. Todres, ‘Maturity’, 48 Houston Law Review 1107 (2012).
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3.1 Age Limits in Different Areas of Law
3.1.1 Juvenile Justice
In the area of juvenile justice several age limits are of
relevance, namely, the MACR, the age of criminal
majority and, in some countries, specific age limits for
deprivation of liberty or other sanctions. Moreover,
states sometimes apply exceptions to the applicable age
limits, for example, in case of serious crimes.37
Globally, the MACR differs substantially between
countries, with some African and Asian countries and
states within the United States that do not have a legal
MACR and others that have an MACR starting as low
as seven years and until eighteen years.38 In Europe, the
overall average MACR is thirteen years, ranging from
ten in England and Wales to eighteen years in, for
example, Belgium.39 However, in some countries, chil-
dren below the MACR may be prosecuted in case of a
serious offence. For example, in Ireland, minors from
the age of ten can be transferred to the adult court in the
case of certain serious offences (s. 75 Children Act
2001). Arthur has characterised the English low MACR
as taking ‘a simplistic functionalist perspective’ that fits
into a punitive model that is focused on the offence
alone and not on the social situation of the child.40
Another possibility is that children who are above the
MACR are not considered criminally responsible in cer-
tain circumstances. In these countries, the doli incapax
principle (the principle of discernment) applies.41 The
doli incapax presumption holds that children under a
certain age, but above the formal MACR, are not capa-
ble of committing a crime, until proven otherwise. As a
consequence, most children will not be prosecuted
because they are deemed not to be criminally responsi-
ble.42 In France, for example, where formally no MACR
is laid down in law, children below the age of ten can be
found capable of discernment when they have commit-
ted an offence, but only protective and educational
measures can be imposed in that case (Art. 122-8 Code
Pénal). The judge has the discretion to assess and deter-
mine whether the child can be held criminally responsi-
37. UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (2019), above n. 31, para.
25; See also N. Lynch, ‘Human Rights for “Hard Cases”: Alternatives to
Imprisonment for Serious Offending by Children and Youth’, in E. Stan-
ley (ed.), Human Rights and Incarceration (2018) 153.
38. D. Cipriani, Children’s Rights and the Minimum Age of Criminal
Responsibility: A Global Perspective (2009).
39. I. Weijers and T. Grisso, ‘Criminal Responsibility of Adolescents: Youth
as Junior Citizenship’, in J. Junger-Tas and F. Dünkel (eds.), Reforming
Juvenile Justice (2009) 45; European Commission, Summary of Contex-
tual Overviews on Children’s Involvement in Criminal Judicial Pro-
ceedings in the 28 Member States of the European Union (2014),
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/
78efc2f4-746e-485c-9c18-9d2509deeedf.
40. R. Arthur, ‘Exploring Childhood, Criminal Responsibility and the Evolv-
ing Capacities of the Child: The Age of Criminal Responsibility in Eng-
land and Wales’, 67 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 269, at 273
(2016).
41. European Commission, above n. 39.
42. K. Hollingsworth, ‘Responsibility and Rights: Children and Their Parents
in the Youth Justice System’, 21 International Journal of Law, Policy
and the Family 190 (2007); Cipriani, above n. 38; T. Crofts, ‘Reforming
the Age of Criminal Responsibility’, 46 South African Journal of Psy-
chology 436 (2016).
ble at any age and from the age of thirteen criminal
sanctions can be applied (Art. 2 Ordonnance n° 45-174
du 2 février 1945 relative à l’enfance delinquente).43
At the other end of the spectrum, most countries have
set the age of criminal majority at the age of eighteen.
Scotland is a notable exception to this rule, where young
people from the age of sixteen are held fully criminally
responsible.44 Other countries also apply exceptions to
this rule, in case of serious crimes, prosecuting minors
below the age of eighteen in an adult court (e.g. England
and Wales and Ireland from the age of ten) or applying
adult sentences (e.g. the Netherlands, France and Bel-
gium from the age of sixteen). In some countries, excep-
tions are made for young adults between eighteen and
twenty-one or twenty-three years of age, who can be
dealt with according to the juvenile criminal law and/or
receive mitigated sentences (e.g. Germany, Austria, the
Netherlands).45 Some recent developments in this
regard, such as raising the upper age limit for young
adults eligible to be dealt with in the juvenile justice
system in the Netherlands from twenty-one to twenty-
three, have been informed by insights from develop-
mental or neuropsychological research.46 Such evid-
ence-based developments in shifting age limits can be
contrasted with developments in other countries, where
the MACR or the age of criminal majority is lowered to
apply adult criminal law to juveniles as part of a more
repressive approach towards juvenile delinquency.47
This highlights the need to address the various argu-
ments underlying age limits, which will be further dis-
cussed in the subsequent section.
Finally, some countries have set age limits for the appli-
cation of certain sentences, most notably, detention.
Generally, in Europe, the minimum age for detention is
the same as the MACR,48 but in Switzerland, for
example, children can only be detained from the age of
fifteen, although the MACR is ten (Art. 22-25 Jugend-
strafgesetz, 9 October 2003). In France, a multi-staged
sanctioning system exists: below the age of ten children
can be found capable of discernment, but only protec-
tive and educational measures can be imposed (Art.
122-8 Code Pénal), children between ten and thirteen
43. Cipriani, above n. 38.
44. L. Francoz-Terminal, ‘La spécificité de la réponse 1a l’acte de délinqu-
ance du mineur en Angleterre et en Écosse’, in Y. Favier and F. Ferrand
(eds.), La justice des mineurs en Europe. Une question de spécialité?
(2011) 91.
45. K. Zeijlmans, T. Sipma and A.M. van der Laan, De aparte bejegening
van jongvolwassen daders in het (jeugd)strafrecht: Een internationale
vergelijking (2019); E.P. Schmidt, S.E. Rap and T. Liefaard, ‘Young
Adults in the Justice System: The Interplay Between Scientific Insights,
Legal Reform and Implementation in Practice in the Netherlands’, Youth
Justice (online first 6 January 2020).
46. S. Matthews, V. Schiraldi and L. Chester, ‘Youth Justice in Europe:
Experience of Germany, the Netherlands, and Croatia in Providing
Developmentally Appropriate Responses to Emerging Adults in the
Criminal Justice System’, 1 Justice Evaluation Journal 59 (2018); see for
some critical reflections on this development Schmidt, Rap and Liefaard,
above n. 45.
47. See for an overview https://archive.crin.org/en/home/what-we-do/
policy/stop-making-children-criminals/states-lowering-age-criminal-
responsibility.html (last visited 8 July 2019).
48. FRA (2018), above n. 35.
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years of age can only receive an educational measure or
educational sanction (Art. Ordonnance n° 45) and crim-
inal sanctions can be imposed on children from the age
of thirteen, with the exception of community service,
which can only be imposed from the age of sixteen,
when minors are allowed to be engaged with paid labour
(Art. 20-5 Ordonnance n° 45; Art. 122-8 Code Pénal).
3.1.2 Family Law and Care Proceedings
Age limits also apply in the area of family law and child
protection, for example, with regard to the legal capacity
of children to act in proceedings and the age from which
children are involved and heard in judicial proceedings.
Kennan and Kilkelly conclude from their review of EU
member states that provisions aiming at ensuring access
to judicial proceedings for children ‘tend to be more rig-
orous in the areas of family law and placement in care
than in other areas of law’.49 One explanation for this is
that the decisions made by the courts in these case
directly concern the life of children, for example, in the
case of custody and living arrangements, mandatory
supervision or out-of-home placement. Recent research
in the Netherlands shows that no explicit purpose of
hearing children in family law proceedings is indicated
in the Dutch law, but judges indicate that the main goal
is to give children the opportunity to tell their story.50
Mol concludes from her comparative legal study involv-
ing New South Wales, Australia, South Africa, France
and the Netherlands that capability requirements of
children in family law proceedings ‘take on all shapes
and sizes’.51 The author focusses on the question
whether children are provided with a (legal) representa-
tive in family law proceedings and on which factors the
appointment of a representative depends. In some of
these jurisdictions, in order to have a representative
appointed children must have capability or should have
reached a certain age; for example, in the Netherlands,
only children from the age of twelve can have a separate
legal representative in care and supervision order pro-
ceedings. In other jurisdictions, the appointment of a
representative depends on the lack of capability or
young age of the child (e.g. New South Wales). In
French family law proceedings, equal to the juvenile
justice system, the principle of capable de discernement
(capable of discernment) applies, and the judge has the
discretion to determine whether the child is capable of
being heard, for example. In general, children from the
age of seven are considered capable to participate in pro-
ceedings.52 Also, in England and Wales, children have
49. Kennan and Kilkelly (2015), above n. 33, at 5.
50. M.R. Bruning, D.J.H. Smeets, K.G.A. Bolscher, J.S. Peper and R. de
Boer, Kind in proces: van communicatie naar effectieve participatie.
Het hoorrecht en de procespositie van minderjarigen in familie- en
jeugdzaken (2020), at 185, 238.
51. C. Mol, ‘Children’s Representation in Family Law Proceedings. A
Comparative Evaluation in Light of Article 12 of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child’, 27 The International Journal of
Children’s Rights 66, at 88 (2019).
52. J.-L. Rongé (2008) and D. Attias (2012) in Mol, above n. 51.
to prove their understanding to be able to participate
and give their views in family law proceedings.53
FRA has recently analysed children’s right to be heard
in adoption, placement (assigning a child to a suitable
place to live) and divorce and custody cases in EU mem-
ber states and concludes that in fewer than half of the
member states children are heard without applying any
age restrictions or other requirements.54 Twelve mem-
ber states have laid down specific age limits for children
to be heard, ranging from ten to fourteen years in
divorce and custody and adoption cases and ten to six-
teen years in placement in care proceedings. Even with-
in countries different age limits apply in different pro-
ceedings, and the child’s consent to such decisions is not
always necessary. In adoption cases, for example, only
twelve member states ask for a child’s own consent,
three of which do not apply minimum age require-
ments.55 Naturally, in family law and care proceedings,
the age of majority is generally set at eighteen. However,
as is the case in the field of juvenile justice, calls are
made to extend care arrangements past the age of eight-
een, to provide young care leavers with the opportunity
to receive care and protection until they have reached
full independence. For example, in the Netherlands it is
possible since 2018 for young people to stay in (state-
funded) foster care until the age of twenty-one, and
youth care arrangements can be extended until the age
of twenty-three.56
3.1.3 Migration Law
Age limits are applied in the field of migration law as
well. For example, countries apply different age limits
with regard to the legal capacity of children to apply for
asylum and the age from which children are heard by
the immigration authorities. Drywood has observed that
within the EU – at least under the first phase of the
Common European Asylum System (CEAS) – age
thresholds were used to control migration flows by lim-
iting the rights of older children in asylum legislation
and family reunification.57 Nowadays, in all member
states, unaccompanied children can act as a sponsor in
the family reunification procedure, except in the United
Kingdom, but quotas are still set by countries and pro-
cedures can take a very long time.58
When children arrive in a country in the company of
their parents, the parents usually apply for asylum for
themselves and their underage children and children are
not allowed to apply for asylum on their own. However,
53. Arthur, above n. 40.
54. FRA (2018), above n. 35.
55. Ibid.
56. M.R. Bruning, T. Liefaard, M.M.C. Limbeek and B.T.M. Bahlmann, Ver-
plichte (na)zorg voor kwetsbare jongvolwassenen? Onderzoek naar de
juridische mogelijkheden voor (verplichte) hulp aan kwetsbare jongvol-
wassenen na kinderbescherming (2016).
57. E. Drywood, ‘Challenging Concepts of the “Child” in Asylum and Immi-
gration Law: The Example of the EU’, 32 Journal of Social Welfare and
Family Law 309 (2010).
58. Coram Children’s Legal Centre, Migrant Children’s Project FACT
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in five EU member states, accompanied children have
the right to make an application on their own behalf
when they are twelve years or older (in the Netherlands;
moreover, in this country, they are required to from the
age of fifteen), fourteen years (in Bulgaria, Hungary and
Romania) or fifteen years (in Greece), respectively. Bel-
gium, Denmark, Portugal and the United Kingdom
extend this right to all children, because they have not
defined a minimum age limit.59
Children who arrive in a country alone can also lack the
legal capacity to apply for asylum as a consequence of
age limits laid down by countries. In fourteen EU mem-
ber states, unaccompanied children cannot independ-
ently apply for asylum and they therefore need a legal
representative until they are 18.60 Ten other EU mem-
ber states have not set any age limit and other countries
have set the same age limit as for accompanied children
(see the previous paragraph). This means that children
below that age depend on a representative to file the
asylum application.61
With respect to children applying for asylum, different
age limits are applied to hearing children in the proced-
ure as well. In ten EU member states specific age limits
are laid down for hearing children in asylum cases, rang-
ing from six to eighteen years. In nine other member
states, courts decide on an ad hoc basis whether or not
to provide children with the opportunity to be heard.62
For example, in the United Kingdom, all unaccompa-
nied children from the age of twelve are interviewed by
the immigration authorities and children below the age
of twelve can be interviewed if they are willing and
found to be mature enough.63 In the Netherlands, unac-
companied children from the age of six are heard, in a
child-friendly interview room and by a specially trained
immigration officer. Accompanied children are in prin-
ciple always heard from the age of fifteen, because they
have to file their own asylum application.64
From this (limited) overview of age limits as applicable
in three different areas of law, it can already be con-
cluded that states vary widely in the application of age
59. FRA (2018), above n. 35; FRA, Mapping Minimum Age Requirements
with Respect to the Rights of the Child in the EU. Asylum Applications
for Accompanied Children (2017a), https://fra.europa.eu/en/
publication/2017/mapping-minimum-age-requirements/asylum-
accompanied.
60. FRA, Mapping Minimum Age Requirements Concerning the Rights
of the Child in the EU. Asylum Applications for Unaccompanied Chil-
dren (2017b), http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2017/mapping-
minimum-age-requirements/asylum-unaccompanied.
61. FRA (2018), above n. 35; see also D. Rosani, ‘Unaccompanied Asylum-
Seeking Children as Rights Holders: Theory and Reality in the EU Legal
System in the Case of Age Assessment and Applications for Inter-
national Protection’, in P. Rodrigues, M. Klaassen, S. Rap and T. Lie-
faard (eds.), Safeguarding Children’s Rights in Immigration Law (2020)
41.
62. FRA (2018), above n. 35.
63. Coram Children’s Legal Centre, Migrant Children’s Project FACTSHEET:
Claiming Asylum as a Child (2017b), https://www.childrenslegal
centre.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Claiming-asylum-as-a-child-
August2017.final_.pdf.
64. Dutch House of Representatives, Vluchtelingenbeleid (2004), at 14,
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-19637-824.pdf (last vis-
ited 8 July 2019).
limits and the assignment of legal capacity to children. A
plethora of diffuse laws and regulations can be identi-
fied, which show how between areas of law different
standards are applied. Often, age limits are used to
involve or exclude children in different legal systems on
different grounds. Sometimes children are excluded cat-
egorically to protect them (e.g. in family or care pro-
ceedings); sometimes they are included, on the basis of
their presumed accountability (e.g. juvenile criminal
law) or for information-gathering purposes (e.g. in
migration law).
4 Discussion and Conclusions
The underlying proposition of the CRC is that children
require specific rights and protections that acknowledge
their age and (im)maturity and that, at the same time,
they should be acknowledged as participants and agents,
entitled to be empowered through participatory rights,
evolving autonomy and legal capacity to exercise their
rights.65 Naturally, age limits are inherently tied to a
specific view on children: they can be seen as vulnerable
and in need of protection (leading to, for example, the
establishment of minimum age limits for the exercise of
certain rights or not holding them accountable for their
behavior in criminal law procedures), while in other
cases they are seen as (increasingly) capable and autono-
mous (for example, in terms of their participation in
judicial procedures). This has different implications,
particularly, for states parties as the primary duty bear-
ers under international children’s rights law. First, this
implies a balancing exercise between the protection of
children and their empowerment and participation.66
Second, this requires a reflection upon the concepts of
age, development, maturity, evolving capacities and
growing autonomy, which play a pivotal role within the
CRC framework.67 The CRC aims to resolve the tension
between the need to protect and the need to empower
children through the notion of evolving capacities. In
practice, however, the more fluid notions underlying the
CRC are regulated by states parties through the more
static concepts of age and age limits.
In this contribution, the central issue revolves around
the question, To what extent is the use of (certain) age
limits justified under international children’s rights law?
The reasons for the involvement of children in judicial
proceedings vary widely among legal fields and different
countries and can be underpinned by scientific evid-
65. The right to be heard can be found in several provisions of the CRC;
more generally, participation is provided for in Arts. 13 (freedom of
expression), 14 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) and 15
(freedom of association), and specifically regarding different contexts, in
Arts. 9(2) (separation from the parents), 21(a) (adoption), 23(1) (chil-
dren with disabilities), 31(1) (cultural activities), 37(d) (deprivation of
liberty) and 40(2)(b)(iv) (juvenile justice).
66. T. Liefaard, ‘Child-Friendly Justice: Protection and Participation of Chil-
dren in the Justice System’, 88 Temple Law Review 905 (2016).
67. The concepts of age, maturity, development and capacities play a role
in Arts. 5, 6, 12, 14, 18, 23, 27, 28, 31, 32, 37, 38 and 40 CRC.
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ence, political arguments or ideological preferences.68
This also shows the variety of conceptualisations and
definitions states and legal fields attach to childhood and
the presumed capacities of children. The CRC provides
rather open norms, such as ‘evolving capacities’ and
‘due weight’, which gives states considerable leeway in
how they involve children in judicial procedures. Dis-
tinguished children’s rights scholars, such as Freeman
and Eekelaar, have advocated that limitations to child-
ren’s autonomy rights should be well substantiated, for
example, with due reference to the protection of their
unhindered development.69 In addition, the CRC Com-
mittee has made numerous recommendations on the
establishment of certain age limits in attempting to pro-
vide guidance to member states and at the same time has
advocated for flexibility and the possibility of applying
exceptions to the norm, in case that would benefit the
child. This has led to a rather inconsistent and scattered
image of age limits under the CRC. The diverging views
and perspectives of the CRC Committee find their basis
in the inconclusive guidance provided by the CRC pro-
visions themselves and, admittedly, do not make it sim-
ple for states parties to establish age limits in conformity
with the international children’s rights framework.
As stated earlier, age limits can sometimes act as a pro-
tection for children, for example, from being prosecuted
and convicted in the adult criminal justice system, by
providing them with mandatory legal support and by
providing legal certainty about whether they are granted
legal capacity and other entitlements.70 Refraining from
laying down age limits in law could lead to legal uncer-
tainty for children, because decision makers would then
be given the discretion to decide whether children are
capable enough to act in a legal procedure. This is one
reason why the CRC Committee is not in favour of
applying the doli incapax principle in juvenile justice pro-
ceedings.71 On the other hand, age limits are also arbi-
trary, restrictive and rigid in the sense that they can
exclude children from certain legal proceedings when no
exceptions to the age threshold can be or are made in
practice. This means that age limits can restrict the par-
ticipation of children in judicial proceedings and catego-
rically exclude children when they fall below the set age
limit. Alternatively, age limits can establish legal obliga-
tions for children to participate without decision makers
being in the position to make an individualised assess-
ment of the capacities of the child to be heard in the
procedure.72
68. Hanson, above n. 8, at 68-69. See also A.O. Cohen, R.J. Bonnie,
K. Taylor-Thompson and B.J. Casey, ‘When Does a Juvenile Become an
Adult: Implications for Law and Policy’, 88 Temple Law Review 769, at
769 (2016).
69. Eekelaar, above n. 10, at 170-171; Freeman (1992), above n. 10, at 68.
70. Crofts, above n. 42; Arthur, above n. 40; C. McDiarmid, ‘After the Age
of Criminal Responsibility: A Defence for Children Who Offend’, 67
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 327 (2016); Hollingsworth (2007),
above n. 42.
71. UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (2019), above n. 31, paras.
26-27.
72. It should be borne in mind that participation in judicial proceedings can
also have harmful consequences for children, for example, when they
On the basis of the analysis presented, our tentative con-
clusion is that states apply age limits not seldomly on
the basis of practical, political or ideological arguments.
While age limits are often indispensable to provide legal
professionals guidance and the child involved legal cer-
tainty, they should be scrutinised to establish whether
they – and especially the aims underlying them – are in
line with international children’s rights law, leaving
room for the child’s autonomy when possible and pro-
viding protection when necessary. At this time, an over-
arching view on the evolving autonomy of the child as
rights holder, having legal capacity, is largely lacking.
This may partly be the result of the inconclusive guid-
ance provided by the CRC Committee on this point.
The dynamic legal position of children, influenced by
their development and level of maturity, should be
acknowledged and applied more consistently by the
CRC Committee, as well as individual states parties, to
provide a dynamic and coherent perspective on child-
ren’s growing autonomy while at the same time safe-
guarding their legal protections and entitlements.73 This
should lead to a well-thought through balance between
protection and participation of children.
Indeed, this is not a simple task. A positive development
that has taken place in this regard – and will hopefully
gain force at both the national and international level –
is the more frequent reference by the CRC Committee
to scientific insights on the development of children
when recommending certain age limits (e.g. in the jus-
tice system).74 However, a principled stance by states in
how and the extent to which children are seen as being
different from adults, with a different legal status and
special rights, is needed as well in order to develop a
consistent approach towards children, their potential
and the role of the law therein.75 In general, the argu-
ments and aims underlying certain age limits should be
made explicit in order to promote an evaluation of age
limits on the basis of the international children’s rights
framework. Moreover, states should analyse the existing
opportunities to secure access to justice, and con-
sequently grant children (effective) remedies, so chil-
dren can challenge the way they are being treated. This
can increase their level of autonomy76 and ensure that
are not involved in an appropriate and child-friendly manner. This may
lead to traumatic experiences and secondary victimisation. See L. Dar-
manaki Farahani and G.L. Bradley, ‘The Role of Psychosocial Resources
in the Adjustment of Migrant Adolescents’, 12 Journal of the Pacific
Rim Psychology 1 (2018); E. Chase, ‘Security and Subjective Wellbeing:
The Experiences of Unaccompanied Young People Seeking Asylum in
the UK’, 35 Sociology of Health and Illness 858 (2013); J.A. Quas and
G.S. Goodman, ‘Consequences of Criminal Court Involvement for Child
Victims’, 18 Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 392 (2012).
73. See also Varadan, above n. 2, at 333.
74. See also the positive evaluation of the increased use of developmental
research by American lawmakers in E.S. Scott and C. Huntington, ‘Con-
ceptualizing Legal Childhood in the Twenty-First Century’, Columbia
Public Law Research Paper No. 14-633 (2019).
75. Hollingsworth (2013), above n. 9.
76. See also T. Liefaard, ‘Access to Justice for Children: Towards a Specific
Research and Implementation Agenda’, 27 The International Journal of
Children’s Rights 195 (2019).
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states can be held accountable vis-à-vis children and
their rights.
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